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‘It is in effect Metis who allows us to blaze a trail, a poros, a way, to find a path through 
obstacles, to discover an expedient (poros), to find a way out (poros) of a situation from 
which there is no way out, which is aporetic.’ 
Sarah Kofman1 
Beyond the aporia produced by Lacan’s ‘psychic essentialism’2, feminist 
interventions after Irigaray have generated a vision of a porous and multiple symbolic 
field; a network of co-existent and overlapping symbolic systems that by definition resist 
and undermine any tendency towards a totalising and determining function and are, most 
crucially, responsive to change3. 
I would like to chart here different and co-existent uses of the ancient Greek myth 
and concept of ‘Metis’ in this context of a post Irigarayian porous model of the 
symbolic(s). More specifically, to examine metis as a transformative practice which 
creates alternative logics and patterns of thought and action not grounded in any telos, 
identity or subject but free of ground altogether: an agency under erasure if you like, that 
is to say, a movement of subversive action that has no affiliation to project goal or ‘molar’ 
politics4 but nevertheless is a way of operating whose movement will perpetually undo 
any logic of control and leave new practices in its trail5. 
In my earlier work on the Oresteian myth6, Metis the ancient goddess – raped, 
impregnated and swallowed by Zeus – was traced as the radically marginalised and hidden 
matricide that the murder of Clytemnestra masked. Metis, I also argued, was conspicuous 
by her absence and this absence was both sustained and subverted by a myriad of 
reversals, inversions, and elipses in the ancient Greek texts and receptions of these texts. I 
went on to argue that bringing Metis, mother of Athena, back into discussions and 
readings of the Oresteia was a significant move that could have implications for other 
contemporary discourses such as psychoanalysis and feminism.  
Via this rereading of the Oresteia that sought to bring Metis out of the darkness of 
Zeus’s stomach I proposed a matricidal law organised around a set of parthenogenetic 
phantasies. Metis’s law and her associated prohibitions could, I argued, contribute to what 
contemporary feminists and philosophers influenced by Irigaray have described as 
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alternative symbolic systems existing according to different laws, structures and 
phantasies not reducible to the phallic Oedipal model. In this way, Metis was used as a 
figure to theorise a maternal law; a law-of-the-mother that could function on at least two 
levels/registers. Firstly, in direct relation to Irigaray’s call for symbolic change that would 
allow for forms of representation, phantasy and modes of subjectivity and sociality that 
the current dominant phallic symbolic forecloses. Secondly, Metis’s Law could be one 
way of limiting or holding in check the strikingly prevalent male parthenogenetic fantasies 
that permeate our culture – and thus could potentially act as a check/limit on an aspect of 
male psychic and physical violence towards women – and more specifically pregnant 
women.7 In this way, Metis’s law is one contribution in the attempt to counter the 
phantasies projected onto and acted out on the maternal feminine whose ubiquity feminist 
theorists and clinicians have so compellingly revealed.  
My first approach and use of Metis can be seen as part of a tradition of feminist 
practice that undertakes work with myth based on the kind of ‘stealing’ or ‘poaching’ 
associated with the feminist bricolage of Adriana Cavarero’s early work8. Since Cixous’ 
Medusa9, Irigaray’s turn to Antigone and the Demeter/Persphone couple10, and Cavarero’s 
reworking of Penelope and other female mythical figures (ISoP), there have been 
important turns to myth from within feminist thought, most notably, Butler’s recent work 
on Antigone11 and Ettinger’s work on Eurydice12. It was in dialogue with this particular 
tradition that Metis, in my earlier work, was decrypted and reactivated as a figure 
signifying laws and practices not reducible to phallic logic. These turnings to myth then – 
whilst all different – relocate, reactivate and re-read mythical figures as a way of positing 
different conditions of subjectivity, cultural intelligibility, representation and kinship 
organisation.  
I have developed and expanded my use of Metis since my early work with the myth 
(OM) and am currently working with the ‘concept’ metis13; a specific form of Greek 
‘cunning intelligence’ as it is evoked so vividly in Detienne and Vernant’s astonishing 
book ‘Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society’14. In their words: 
 
Metis is a type of intelligence and thought, a way of knowing; it implies a complex but very 
coherent body of mental attitudes and intellectual behaviour which combine flair, wisdom, 
forethought, subtlety of mind, deception, resourcefulness, vigilance, opportunism, various 
skills and experience acquired over the years. It applies to situations which are shifting, 
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disconcerting and ambiguous, which do not lend themselves to precise measurement, exact 
calculation or rigorous logic (p. 3). 
 
Detienne and Vernant’s book is an act of intricate intellectual archaeology devoted 
to reclaiming metis as it manifests itself in Greek myth, literature and culture. They 
demonstrate that this form of cunning intelligence was very much alive and an important 
aspect of Greek culture and society – but has been systematically marginalised and 
overlooked by modern Greek/Classics scholars and philosophers because of the dominant 
legacy of the Platonic metaphysical tradition that condemned and banished metis as an 
unreliable corrupter of the Truth.  
 
Modern Greek scholars who have neglected the importance of its role, its impact or even its 
existence, have remained faithful to a particular image Greek thought created of itself, in 
which metis is conspicuous by its absence (CIGC, p. 42-48).  
 
Through their analyses, Vernant and Detienne present us with the essential features of 
metis, its mode of operation, its terminology and its associations. They do this by tracing 
the concept back to its origins in the fields of hunting and fishing. Metis, the ‘many 
faceted’ intelligence, belongs to the duplicitous world of traps and devices: the knot, the 
net, the weave, the rope, the mesch, the bait, the noose and the snare.  
Vernant and Detienne identify the fox and the octopus as creatures most richly 
endowed with metis and use them as models to describe the full scope of cunning 
intelligence that extends far beyond the world of fishing and hunting – and can be found in 
allusions and associations across ten centuries that separate Homer from Oppian (CIGC, p. 
44). Metis is a way of operating, an intelligence always ‘ready to pounce’ an action based 
upon a ‘many faceted knowledge’ using trick, deceit and vigilance. Metis is an action 
generated by ‘weighty condensed thought informed by experience’; it seems impulsive but 
is not at all. Metis ‘foresees the unforeseeable’ –seizes opportunity and is forever on the 
alert. Metis is ‘multiple, many coloured and shifting’ – it belongs to ‘the world of 
appearance and becoming’ – polymorphous, pliable, fluid – it can never be pinned down 
or seized. Like the octopus ‘it assumes every form without being imprisoned in any’ 
(CIGC, p. 39).  
Metis functions through inversion and reversal; it pertains to all that is pliable, 
slippery and twisted, oblique, elusive and ambiguous, and it moves in more than one 
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direction simultaneously15. Like the cunning of Hermes (rich in metis), who confuses his 
pursuers by reversing the tracks of the hooves of his cattle: ‘putting the front hoof-marks 
at the back and back ones at the front’ (CIGC, p. 41) and himself walking backwards, 
creating double tracks and thus conjuring an enigmatic ‘metic16’ figure that 
simultaneously points in divergent directions. 
Vernant and Detienne’s tracing of metis to the ruses of the sea, to the specific tactics 
of octopus and other fishes – known for their ingenious capacity for escape from situations 
of extreme danger (against all odds) – leads them to conclude that: 
 
Relations of force are constantly upset by the intervention of metis…the defeat of the weak 
and frail is not a foregone conclusion (CIGC, p. 46) 
 
One of the salient properties of metis that Vernant and Detienne are passionate to 
convey is its radical resistance to being fixed or being made to be/do one thing. It is a 
movement rather than a position, and thus it can never be claimed for any cause or 
projected idea. It cannot be made to represent anything nor can it be identified with –since 
it is never itself but always already shifting and reversing. It can neither be claimed as a 
stable concept and it can have no affiliations – any such move to claim metis as a shoring 
up of a position, argument or identity betrays the very specificity of its logic.  
Yet it is striking that on several occasions in Vernant and Detienne’s book, they will 
explicitly declare that metis is inextricably bound up with power relations. They are 
consistent and persistent in placing metis as functioning on the side of the ‘weaker’, the 
‘frail’ and the subordinate – operating to ‘reverse the rules accepted in a trial of strength’ 
with stratagem that are like ‘spells to oppose brute force’ (CIGC, p. 44):  
 
That which makes possible a reversal of power such as which is characteristic of metis – 
which enables the smaller and weaker to dominate the bigger and stronger (CIGC, p. 44).  
 
Seemingly then, the interventions of metis are always in the service of the 
subordinate, subjected or oppressed, and the cunning of metis will forever disrupt and 
undo consolidations of power (create a ‘blazing trail a way out (poros) (BA, p. 7)’ from 
bondage and domination). In this way it is not – at first glance – hard to imagine how 
metis could be utilised in the service of a politics of liberation via the subversion of power 
structures. 
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But Vernant and Detienne are clear that ‘whatever metis wins it does not keep’ (my 
italics) (CIGC, p. 28). Metis may reverse power relations, reverse binaries, turn the hunter 
into hunted, turn rational certainty inside out – but by its nature it will never shore up, 
consolidate, develop or sustain. Its movement will only ever shift ground and will never 
take root. In this way, metis has a very particular relation to power and in turn to politics – 
a relation that brings paradox (which is an essential part of its nature) to any attempt to 
‘use’ metis in the service of political project, revolution, strategy or goal, hence the 
challenge it brings to feminist praxis; our context here.  
Metis, most crucially does not want power; what it wins it does not keep – what can 
it mean then to identify metis as part of a feminist praxis related to theoretical 
transformations of the feminine and maternal? Can we tally the not keeping of metis with 
a viable post-structuralist feminist approach? What can this paradoxical double direction 
of metis – undoing power relations and not keeping what it wins – contribute to feminist 
philosophy and theory? In addition, its strong resonances with the recent Deleuzian turn in 
feminist thought as well as with some trends in Queer Theory can be left at this point as an 
open question to which I will return.  
In this way, I want to think further about this fundamental juxtaposition that is 
essential to the nature of metis: on the one hand, its movement that reverses or destabilises 
power relations in the service of the subordinate; and on the other hand, the not keeping 
what it wins. I suggest that such a model, despite being organised around paradox (and 
perhaps in part because of this) could be generative in developing further the tools and 
methods available to feminist philosophy and theory to get through/beyond the often 
‘aporetic’ debates in feminist thought regarding notions of agency, subject position and 
identity – the latter of which have long been shown to be counterproductive for a viable 
post-structuralist feminist theory, politics and practice.  
Metis, in its transformative action that undermines power relations and does not 
keep what it wins, cannot be used in the service of notions of possession, ownership, 
legitimacy and sovereignty. It is an action without origin – no single subject is its cause or 
reason – rather its movement emerges from the multiple and the heterogeneous. Metis 
transforms the constellation of power but crucially never comes from or acts from one 
place. In this way, metis produces an action or an intervention that does not depend upon a 
unitary subject or intent. Its transforming capacity is precisely in its multiplicity and 
simultaneous movement in divergent directions. Without this crucial characteristic of not 
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keeping what it wins, it would inevitably become another potential form of domination 
and or mastery.  
Metis is a form of cunning intelligence that functions from and in ‘a world of 
becoming, in circumstances of conflict’ (CIGC, p. 46). It has no desire or idea of stability, 
mastery or resolution, and defies every tendency towards winning, keeping or controlling. 
If it has a trajectory that can be defined, then it is a circular one. Vernant and Detienne use 
the circle to describe the ultimate expression of metis:  
 
The ultimate expression of these qualities is the circle, the bond that is perfect because it 
completely turns back on itself, with neither beginning nor end, nor front or rear, and which 
rotation becomes both mobile and immobile, moving in both directions at once (CIGC, p. 
42 – 48).   
 
The continuous curve of the circle – which expresses the ultimate nature of metis – 
can by its very nature have absolutely no investment in teleology, genealogy or futurity. 
This type of cunning intelligence that, according to Deteinne and Vernant, had a major 
impact on Greek thought possesses a ‘power that is beyond ordinary logic’ (CIGC, p. 42 -
48). This alternative epistemology functioning ‘beyond ordinary logic’ is shown by 
Detienne and Vernant to be a fundamental part of Greek thought that was always a co-
existent and perhaps disruptive and/or competing model of thought and action to that of 
the eternal ‘Being’ of the Platonic tradition. 
Deteinne and Vernant’s evocation of metis and their claim that metis ‘seems to have 
had a profound effect upon one whole dimension of Greek thought’ (CIGC, p. 47) is part 
of a philological project or an intellectual archaeology – but their final comment that 
closes this massive study reveals a distinct politicised gesture toward the contemporary 
intellectual scene, and more specifically to post-structuralist thought (that was flourishing 
outside of classics in France at the time of their researching and writing this book): 
 
The concept of Platonic Truth which has overshadowed a whole area of intelligence with its 
own kinds of understanding has never really ceased to haunt western metaphysical thought 
(CIGC, p. 318) (my emphasis). 
 
The Platonic haunting that they speak of motivates the foreclosure of this kind of 
cunning intelligence from recognition/value or acknowledgement. Relegated to 
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invisibility, written out of the accounts of Greek philosophy and epistemology, we can 
now see the relation between the myth Metis and the concept metis – both 
incorporated/swallowed and violently marginalised. We cannot also ignore the fact that 
this connection between the myth Metis and concept metis brings the maternal into the 
terrain of metic cunning intelligence.  
Such a radical leaving out of what Vernant and Detienne show to have been a 
crucial and massive part of Greek culture and thought can be seen to be related to this 
‘haunting’, this continuing hold of the static ontology of metaphysics from Parmenedies to 
Plato. Vernant and Detienne’s book then is an intervention that seeks to disrupt this legacy 
by showing that metis is older than Being and Truth – and was always already exerting its 
extraordinary logic and so undermining the Platonic model.  
Vernant and Detienne’s collection and analysis of the array of qualities and practices 
comprising metis produces a counter epistemology that resonates strongly with some of 
the salient thrusts of contemporary poststructuralist philosophy17. Its publication in 1974 is 
significant in that around this time in France was the emergence of some of the key texts 
of contemporary French post-structuralism that would produce radical and transformative 
interventions into the history of philosophy and Western thought. Vernant and Detienne’s 
book is part of this intellectual climate and I think there is an implicit speaking to it. 
Whilst they are at pains to avoid/resist using metis didactically or holding it up as some 
kind of open to all critical tool or methodology (since that would apparently betray its 
essential nature), there is a distinct sense that Vernant and Detienne’s work on metis was 
not only a massive contribution to Classics and our understanding of ancient Greek culture 
and thought, but also was almost like throwing bait to contemporary French thought – to 
be snapped up and used as armoury or tactic to aid the break from the traditional Logos – 
a break that defines the continental contemporary philosophical scene. The reclaiming of 
Metis and its dissemination at this particular historical moment was no coincidence.  
There is a significant scattering of appearances and mentions of metis – as it is 
explicated by Vernant and Detienne – in contemporary French philosophy and post-
structuralist thought. It is beyond the scoop of this paper to discus the reception of metis 
as cunning intelligence in the canon of continental post-structuralism. For our purposes 
here I want to look at firstly at the most substantial political taking up of metis in 
contemporary thought, and secondly, at if and how Detienne and Vernant’s work on metis 
has been taken up in contemporary feminist thought.  
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Vernant and Detienne’s model of metis was taken up most substantially by Michel 
de Certeau in his work The Practice of Everyday Life (1984).18 Here, metis was used to 
develop his distinction between tactics and strategy that was crucial to de Certeau’s theory 
of resistance to the determining power of the socioeconomic order and the ‘grid of 
discipline’ (PEL, p. xvii). Metis was used to demonstrate a mode of operation in everyday 
life that complicated ideas of activity and passivity in relation to the production and 
consumption of culture – namely de Certeau’s notion of the ‘tactic’ and of ‘active 
consumption’: 
 
Many everyday practices (talking, reading, moving about, shopping, cooking etc.) are 
tactical in character. And so are more generally, many ways of operating: victories of the 
“weak” over the “strong” (whether the strength be that of powerful people or the violence 
of things or of an imposed order etc.), clever tricks, knowing how to get away with things, 
“hunters cunning,” maneuvers, polymorphic simulations, joyful discoveries, poetic as well 
as warlike. The Greeks called these “ways of operating” metis. But they go much further 
back, to the immemorial intelligence displayed in the tricks and imitations of plants and 
fishes. From the depths of the ocean to the streets of modern megalopolises, there is a 
continuity and permanence of these tactics (PEL, p. xvii).  
 
Metis is drawn upon to describe a mode of operating that explains how an entire 
society resists being reduced to the terms of the dominant order with its ‘extensive grid of 
discipline’. De Certeau seems to be using metis to think through and expand the 
implications of Foucault’s work19. Metis then is embraced and placed on the side of the 
tactic – that is to say, as the basis of a particular and ubiquitous political action of 
resistance whose ‘active consumption’ of culture transforms and reactivates it according to 
a logic that counters the total interpellation by the dominant order. De Certeau is clear that 
such a mode of operation and practice ‘does not imply a return to the individual’ (PEL, p. 
xii) and claims that: 
 
The question at hand concerns modes of operation, schemata of action and not directly the 
subjects or persons who are their authors or vehicles (PEL, p. xvii). 
 
De Certeau sees in metis a model for action and resistance that refuses the 
imperialist mastery of notions of agency and self. Metis for de Certeau describes and 
celebrates the cunning mechanisms by which the apparently passive and dominated make 
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do and make use of what is at hand to transform, resist and create alternative ways of 
operating in the everyday navigation of systems of power, discourse and culture. It is 
precisely the essential features of metis described earlier that de Certeau is engaging with: 
the subversion of power in the service of the ‘weakest’, the ‘not keeping what it wins” – 
and that metis undoes what de Certeau calls ‘the proper place’ (PEL, p. xvii) that is the 
ground from which panoptic strategies launch their domination and control.  
It is clear that de Certeau embraces metis ethically and, one could say, in a utopian 
vein. Metis as tactic and circumvention is clearly used here in the service of a theory of 
resistance to power and oppression – as a way to describe ‘the subtle movements of 
escape and evasion’20 and in turn for a theory of survival, transformation and creativity. 
The Metic tactic for de Certeau will reveal the limitations of systems of power and reveal 
their porous and pliable nature. For de Certeau, metis is a way of operating that has never 
ceased across centuries and species (from the depth of the ocean to the modern city) and 
helps him theorise and describe the permanent force of cunning that will always ‘blaze a 
trail’ (BA, p. 7) and twist, subvert and/or limit the sovereignty of the all powerful.  
If metis is seen as improvised interventions on behalf of the otherwise powerless, it 
cannot be ignored as a source of creativity and intervention21. 
Metis travels from Detienne and Vernant’s restorative account to de Certeau’s direct 
political and ethical usage and then we can track down further contemporary engagements 
with metis as cunning intelligence via de Certeau in areas spanning cultural studies, 
rhetoric, anthropology and, most recently, in organisational theory22.  
For the most part, the references to metis in feminist theory refer to the mythical 
figure Metis, the goddess, raped and incorporated by Zeus. Metis appears more generally 
as a metaphor to describe this violent action of raping, swallowing and foreclosing that 
characterises the ubiquitous phallogocentric relation to the ‘feminine’.  
The concept metis – as cunning intelligence – is mentioned briefly by Cavarero in 
her discussion of Penelope’s metic cunning in the doing and undoing of her weave (ISP, p. 
30). Yet, despite its explicit connection (via the thread that links the myth Metis and 
concept metis) to the ‘maternal feminine’, according to Detienne and Vernant and also to a 
major alternative epistemology/ practice ‘beyond ordinary logic’, it has not been taken up 
substantially in feminist thought. It is as if the excavation of the myth and the mythical 
maternal goddess tallied more with the dominant strain of feminism linked to ‘molar 
politics’, linked to ideas of a maternal subject and to theories which claimed for the 
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maternal something specific that would further ground ideas of female subjectivities and 
female imaginaries.  
Metis as concept – as cunning intelligence – by its nature (as we have seen) works 
against any kind of intervention linked to aims for consolidating or grounding the 
feminine and/or maternal to any kind of identity, subject, ethics or law, whereas the myth 
and figure Metis is clearly far more open to be used in this way – hence the tradition of 
feminist bricolage discussed earlier.  
Metis in its conceptual form –as cunning intelligence – is neither an identity nor is it 
a theory of gradual incremental change or development. Metis is not connected to the 
rational subject23 at all: 
 
In gradual, incremental change and improvement there is no metis. In metis there is the 
shock of the unexpected and a possibility of unpredictable modifications. Metis is the 
practice of the radically new – it is pure becoming.24 
 
Perhaps the time is ripe for the concept of metis as cunning intelligence to ‘blaze a 
trail’ in feminist philosophy. Of course I do not want, in any way, to reduce or conflate 
metis to concepts in Deleuzian feminist philosophy or vice versa. The connections or 
resonances can at this stage be suspended as a question and/or possibility.   
In my early work on Metis (the myth) that focused on the raped and swallowed 
maternal figure, I was working in a tradition far more closely related to the molar politics 
related to polemic and strategy and the creation of a ground from which to theorise the 
‘feminine’ outside the projections of what Irigaray called the masculine imaginary – and 
so counter the phallogocentric underpinnings of our culture. The blindspot or untheorised 
aspect of that project was the exciting possibilities regarding the connection between the 
swallowed pregnant Metis banished to Zeus’s stomach and the concept metis – as cunning 
intelligence – also banished from the legacy of philosophy.  
The connection between the myth and the concept shows the double direction of 
M/metis25 (the hoof-marks suggesting two opposite directions simultaneously). Like the 
‘crab words’ that Vernant and Detienne describe as belonging to metis – ‘two headed 
statements’ (CIGC, p. 39), a sideways movement, a double action, an operation existing 
beyond static oppositions, ‘a continual oscillation between two poles (turning into its 
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opposite neither one not the other)’ (CIGC, p. 39). In this way the actions of M/metis will 
not favour one model over another but will blaze a trail of cunning interventions. 
  Via M/metis then I link the ‘molar politics’ of feminist bricolage and the maternal 
law (described earlier) with a molecular movement of cunning intelligence linked to 
notions of becoming and imperceptiblity26. M/metis is simultaneous divergent actions that 
are neither in harmony or discord, nor conflated or opposed not integrated or resolved but 
in a perpetual coexistent binding that may open up a myriad of cunning (maternal?27) 
interventions.  
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